Autonomous system
AS9405 TPS-CN-AS Test platform Service Center
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Test Platform Service Center (CERNET)
research education legacy
AS9405 (TPS-CN-AS) is registered as the Test Platform Service Center, an APNIC record administered out of Tsinghua University in Beijing and listed as a CERNET member. CERNET is China's national research and education network, and its next-generation-internet work — the CNGI/CERNET2 programme — is coordinated from Tsinghua. The address space this AS announces is drawn from CERNET-held ranges, which ties the ASN to that academic-networking effort rather than to any commercial operator.
What it's used for
The routing evidence describes a testbed, not a production service network. RIS observes just 3 IPv4 prefixes totalling 1,280 addresses — a 103.115.120.0/22, the /24 inside it announced separately, and a lone 101.7.7.0/24 — against one full IPv6 /32 (2402:e740::/32) and only 2 observed BGP neighbours. That ratio is the tell: a tiny scrap of IPv4 alongside an entire /32 of IPv6 is the shape of a research network built around IPv6 experimentation, where v4 exists only for management and reachability. Two neighbours means it is single-purpose and single-homed, originating its own space with no transit role.
Notable
- Announcing a /22 and one of its /24s at the same time is a routing-policy artefact, usually a segment steered differently or protected against a specific failure. It does not indicate two organisations.
- The registry contact sits inside a university, which is normal for Chinese research-network resources but means the "Service Center" name should not be read as a commercial testing business.
- The IPv6 allocation vastly outweighs the IPv4 one, consistent with CERNET2's long-standing role as one of the largest native-IPv6 academic backbones.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 2 prefixes · 1.28K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CN | China | 3 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9405- Registry name
- TPS-CN-AS
- Abuse contact
- abuse@cernet.edu.cn
- Registered
- 2008-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-09-03
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 4 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 3 authorising AS9405
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 75% registered · 3 of 4 announcements
- Route objects
- 3 naming AS9405
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere