Autonomous system
AS9323 DGUNET-AS DONGGUK University
Education APNIC
Summary
Dongguk University
education university research legacy
AS9323 (DGUNET-AS) is held by Dongguk University, a private university in Seoul, South Korea. The ASN carries DGUnet, the university's campus network.
What it's used for
RIS sees 97 IPv4 prefixes carrying 24,832 addresses, no IPv6, and only 2 observed BGP neighbours. Two neighbours against twenty-five thousand addresses is the unmistakable signature of an end-site network: it consumes transit from a small number of Korean upstreams and originates nothing but its own space. There are no downstream customers and no peering footprint to speak of.
What stands out is the granularity. Almost every one of the 97 announcements is a /24, drawn from two ranges — the older 210.94.x space and the newer 223.195.x space — with no covering aggregates. Announcing a hundred individual /24s instead of a few aggregates is a per-subnet routing style: each building, department or lab network gets its own prefix in BGP. It inflates the prefix count without implying any fragmentation of ownership, and it is fairly common on Korean campus networks. The two distinct ranges most likely reflect the university's campuses and an allocation received at a later date.
Notable
- 97 prefixes for under 25,000 addresses gives an average announcement size of a /24, one of the most deaggregated profiles in this ASN range.
- No IPv6 is announced, so the campus is IPv4-only in the global routing table.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 4 prefixes · 24.83K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KR | Korea, Republic of | 4 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS9323- Registry name
- DGUNET-AS-KR
- Abuse contact
- hostmaster@nic.or.kr
- Registered
- 1998-06-03
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 97 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS9323
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 97 of 97 announcements
- Route objects
- 107 naming AS9323
Reputation
Classification and threat
Education University, school or national research and education network.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere