asn.dev

Routing security

AS903 UNIFIED-COMMUNICATIONS-TECHNOLOGIES

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 100% 19 of 19 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 4 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

19 observed

Every prefix observed with AS903 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
155.103.224.0/22RPKI validIRR1
155.103.224.0/23RPKI validIRR covering58
155.103.224.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
155.103.225.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
209.112.92.0/22RPKI validIRR53
209.112.92.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.112.93.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.112.94.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.112.95.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.16.0/22RPKI validIRR53
209.141.16.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.17.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.18.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.19.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.20.0/22RPKI validIRR53
209.141.20.0/23RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.20.0/24RPKI validIRR covering53
209.141.21.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58
209.141.22.0/24RPKI validIRR covering58

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

4 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS903 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
155.103.224.0/22/24ARIN
209.112.92.0/22/24ARIN
209.141.16.0/22/24ARIN
209.141.20.0/22/24ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

7 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS903 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
155.103.224.0/22ARINUnified Communications Technologies, LLCMNT-UCTL-22026-02-05Announced
155.103.224.0/22RADBUCT-2MAINT-AS276262026-02-05Announced
209.112.92.0/22RADBUCT-1MAINT-AS276262024-07-15Announced
209.141.16.0/22ARINJoytelMNT-JOYTE2026-02-05Announced
209.141.16.0/22RADB—MAINT-AS276262025-02-12Announced
209.141.20.0/22ARINJoytelMNT-JOYTE2026-02-05Announced
209.141.20.0/22RADB—MAINT-AS276262025-02-14Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS903 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-FLHSIRADBLists AS903 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS903 as a direct member
AS-SLF-13760-DOWNSTREAMRADBLists AS903 as a direct member
AS-UCTRADBLists AS903 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-01 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-01. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.