asn.dev

Routing security

AS9011 The Patent Office

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 10 of 10 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

10 observed

Every prefix observed with AS9011 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:ed00::/32RPKI validIRR30
212.100.0.0/19RPKI validIRR53
212.100.0.0/24RPKI validIRR57
212.100.1.0/24RPKI validIRR57
212.100.2.0/23RPKI validIRR57
212.100.4.0/24RPKI validIRR57
212.100.5.0/24RPKI validIRR57
212.100.6.0/23RPKI validIRR57
212.100.8.0/21RPKI validIRR57
212.100.16.0/20RPKI validIRR57

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS9011 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
212.100.0.0/19/19RIPENCC
212.100.0.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.100.1.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.100.2.0/23/23RIPENCC
212.100.4.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.100.5.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.100.6.0/23/23RIPENCC
212.100.8.0/21/21RIPENCC
212.100.16.0/20/20RIPENCC
2a00:ed00::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

3 declared

This network has signed an ASPA record naming its transit providers. Each is compared against the upstreams observed in routing paths.

ASNetworkASPARouting paths
AS2856British Telecommunications LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS5089Virgin Media LimitedDeclaredObserved
AS13335Cloudflare, Inc.DeclaredObserved

An observed upstream that is not declared is not necessarily a leak: our upstream inference cannot tell a transit provider from a peer seen in the same position. A declared provider that is never observed is usually a backup path.

IRR

Registered route objects

10 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS9011 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
212.100.0.0/19RIPEIntellectual Property OfficeUKPO-RIPE-MNT2015-03-17Announced
212.100.0.0/24RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2020-10-01Announced
212.100.1.0/24RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2020-10-01Announced
212.100.2.0/23RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2021-01-12Announced
212.100.4.0/24RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2020-10-01Announced
212.100.5.0/24RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2020-10-01Announced
212.100.6.0/23RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2021-01-12Announced
212.100.8.0/21RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2021-01-12Announced
212.100.16.0/20RIPE—UKPO-RIPE-MNT2021-01-12Announced
2a00:ed00::/32RIPE—INFRAIPO-MNT2025-06-19Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS9011 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BTGB-CUSTRIPELists AS9011 as a direct member
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS9011 as a direct member
AS-NTLIRIPELists AS9011 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS9011 as a direct member
AS-UUNETUKRIPELists AS9011 as a direct member
AS13335:AS-CUSTOMERSARINLists AS9011 as a direct member
AS262206:AS-CRIRADBLists AS9011 as a direct member
AS37271:AS-TEST-CFRADBLists AS9011 as a direct member
AS51202:AS-ALLALTDBLists AS9011 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-01 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-01. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.