asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8962 CUW-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly PL
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Centrum Obsługi Administracji Rządowej

Poland · AI-generated

government legacy

CUW-AS is held by the Centrum Obsługi Administracji Rządowej — the Government Administration Service Centre, a Polish state budgetary institution in Warsaw that provides shared IT, procurement and facilities services to central-government bodies. The handle CUW comes from its former name, Centrum Usług Wspólnych (Shared Services Centre).

What it's used for

  • Hosting and connectivity for Polish central-government services. The rDNS on its single /24 is entirely inside .gov.pl: cokprm1.cokprm.gov.pl and similar hosts belong to the service centre of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, alongside dns1.centrum.gov.pl and ckp.gov.pl.
  • 256 IPv4 addresses on one prefix, two BGP neighbours, no customers. Small, but the addresses front real state infrastructure.

Notable

  • Classified by what the space carries, not what the holder's legal form is. "Instytucja Gospodarki Budżetowej" is a self-financing state entity that looks vaguely commercial on paper; the rDNS says .gov.pl and that settles it.
  • A shared-services agency is exactly the kind of holder whose small address block matters out of proportion to its size, because several ministries' public-facing services can sit behind it.

Interesting

  • Poland has repeatedly reorganised its government shared-services provider, and the AS handle still carries the abbreviation of an earlier incarnation. The registry object is a fossil record of the last reorganisation.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS20853eTOP sp. z o.o.39
AS5617Orange Polska Spolka Akcyjna19

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
PLPoland1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8962
Registry name
CUW-AS
Registrant
ETOP-MNT
Abuse contact
ripe_coar@centrum.gov.pl
Registered
2009-08-19
Last changed
2021-01-07
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS8962
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS8962

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check