asn.dev

Routing security

AS8937 SALINK-AS Saarland

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 86% 6 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 9 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8937 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
192.54.36.0/24No ROAIRR51
192.109.199.0/24RPKI validIRR51
193.24.16.0/21RPKI validIRR51
193.24.16.0/24RPKI validIRR51
193.24.17.0/24RPKI validIRR51
193.24.19.0/24RPKI validIRR51
212.18.192.0/19RPKI validIRR51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

9 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8937 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
192.109.199.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.24.16.0/21/21RIPENCC
193.24.16.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.24.17.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.24.18.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.24.19.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.141.183.0/24/24RIPENCC
193.141.188.0/24/24RIPENCC
212.18.192.0/19/19RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS8937 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
193.24.18.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Not announced
193.24.20.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Not announced
193.24.21.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Not announced
193.24.22.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Not announced
193.24.23.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Not announced
193.141.183.0/24RIPECDSNET, Staatskanzlei Saarbruecken,SAARGATE-DE-MNT2012-04-13Not announced
193.141.188.0/24RIPEIT-DLZ-SAARLANDSAARGATE-DE-MNT2018-08-07Not announced
192.54.36.0/24RIPEDIASB-LAN, DIaLOGIKa GmbH,SAARGATE-DE-MNT2012-04-13Announced
192.109.199.0/24RIPEDIASB-LAN2, DIaLOGIKa GmbH,SAARGATE-DE-MNT2015-12-23Announced
193.24.16.0/21RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, Saarbruecken,SAARGATE-DE-MNT2012-04-13Announced
193.24.16.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Announced
193.24.17.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Announced
193.24.19.0/24RIPESLPOL-NET, MDI, PG Dipol, SaarbrueckenSAARGATE-DE-MNT2016-05-24Announced
212.18.192.0/19RIPEVSENET / Teresto / artelisSAARGATE-DE-MNT2012-04-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8937 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-SALINKRIPELists AS8937 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.