Autonomous system
AS8934 NITC Amman - Jordan
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
National Information Technology Center (Jordan)
government legacy
NITC is the National Information Technology Center of Jordan, based in Amman. It is the government body that runs Jordan's shared public-sector IT infrastructure, including the Secure Government Network that connects ministries and agencies.
What it's used for
- Connectivity and hosting for Jordanian government entities: ministries, public institutions and their web, mail and application systems.
- Roughly 11,000 IPv4 addresses, dominated by
193.188.64.0/19split into individual /24s per tenant, plus93.93.144.0/21,185.109.120.0/22and an IPv6 /29.
Notable
- rDNS confirms the government role rather than the name doing the work: the hosts that resolve sit under
.gov.jo— for example a Jordan Royal Medical Services system — alongside affiliated public bodies. There are no subscriber pools, no dynamic naming and no commercial hosting patterns. - The /19 being announced as a long series of separate /24s is characteristic of a shared-services network: each agency gets its own block, and they are advertised individually rather than aggregated.
Interesting
- Address space held by a national IT centre should be read as government use rather than government-owned ISP. Nothing here serves the Jordanian public as an access network.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Aqaba IX | Aqaba, Jordan | 84.252.106.13 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 10 prefixes · 11.26K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| JO | Jordan | 11 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8934- Registry name
- NITC
- Registrant
- JO-YN14
- Abuse contact
- networks@nitc.gov.jo
- Registered
- 2002-05-13
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 27 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 7 authorising AS8934
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 96% registered · 26 of 27 announcements
- Route objects
- 118 naming AS8934
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere