Autonomous system
AS8834 RESMAN
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
ResMAN (City of Rzeszow)
government municipal legacy
RESMAN is held by Gmina Miasto Rzeszow — the municipality of Rzeszow, in south-eastern Poland. ResMAN is the city's own broadband metropolitan network, built with EU regional-development funding in two stages from the mid-2000s.
What it's used for
Municipal connectivity. The network was built to link the city's public-administration buildings — around sixty of them, with well over a thousand network ports — and to run free public Wi-Fi hotspots for residents, originally over a WiMAX radio access layer in the 3.5 GHz band across Rzeszow and the neighbouring commune of Krasne. This is a city government's network for its own institutions and public services, not a commercial ISP.
All sampled addresses resolve to the uniform template ip-IP-ADDR.resman.pl, applied flatly across the block — first-party reverse DNS on a single self-registered prefix.
Notable
- One prefix,
84.38.160.0/20— about 4,100 addresses — with two observed BGP neighbours and no IPv6. First seen in BGP in March 2007, matching the second construction stage of the network. - The holder is the municipality itself, not a company it owns, so the AS is classified by use as
governmentrather than by any telecom brand attached to it.
Interesting
ResMAN is one of dozens of Polish municipal metropolitan-area networks built with EU cohesion funds in the 2007–2013 programming period. Many exist mainly on paper; this one still originates its own routes and puts free hotspots on the street.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-18, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 4.10K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| PL | Poland | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8834- Registry name
- Resman
- Registrant
- lir-pl-enformatel-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@inetia.pl
- Registered
- 2007-03-08
- Last changed
- 2022-10-13
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS8834
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS8834
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,784 prefixes, as published 2026-10-19. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere