Autonomous system
AS8818 Tele Greenland
Residential RIPE
Summary
Tusass A/S (Tele Greenland)
isp residential legacy
Tele Greenland in the registry handle is now Tusass A/S, Greenland's state-owned national telecommunications operator. It runs essentially all of the island's connectivity: fixed broadband, mobile, the submarine cables to Iceland and Canada, and the satellite links that serve the settlements the fibre does not reach.
What it's used for
Consumer and business Internet access across Greenland. Every sampled address in the announced space resolves into the adsl.gl zone with the classic subscriber-pool pattern host-IP-ADDR.adsl.gl — a generic per-address PTR template applied across 178.170.0.0, 88.83.0.0, 37.230.0.0 and 128.0.70.0 blocks alike. That is an eyeball access network, not backbone or hosting infrastructure.
Notable
- ~34k IPv4 addresses across 26 prefixes plus IPv6 — small in absolute terms, but this is the network for a population of about 56,000 spread over the world's largest island.
- Only one observed BGP neighbour. Greenland's traffic is effectively single-homed onto a Danish upstream; there is no domestic peering fabric to speak of.
- The
.glrDNS zone is one of the few places where a country-code TLD and an ISP's subscriber pool are the same thing.
Interesting
The company rebranded from TELE-POST / Tele Greenland to Tusass in 2020 (the word means roughly "message" or "news" in Greenlandic), but the RIR handle still carries the old name — a routine case of a registry handle outliving the brand.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| GL | Greenland | 27 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8818- Registry name
- UNSPECIFIED
- Registrant
- AS8818-MNT
- Abuse contact
- gl-admin@tusass.gl
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2017-11-15
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere