asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8814 AZT-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 17.15K 21 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly AZ
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Aztelekom LLC

Azerbaijan · AI-generated

isp broadband legacy

AS-AZTELEKOM belongs to Aztelekom LLC, Azerbaijan's national fixed-line operator. Established in 1992 and restructured as an LLC in 2015, it is state-held (today under AZCON Holding) and serves the regions of Azerbaijan outside Baku — telephony, broadband and internet, plus ownership of the regional pole, duct and fibre infrastructure.

What it's used for

Retail fixed broadband and telephony for regional Azerbaijan. Aztelekom combines 57 local telecom enterprises, an international exchange and a cable infrastructure centre, and it took Ookla's "Fastest Fixed Network Internet Provider in Azerbaijan" award in 2025. This AS announces roughly 16,900 IPv4 addresses across 42 mostly-/24 prefixes, no IPv6, and shows only one observed BGP neighbour — a single-upstream access network, not a carrier.

The inventory is a patchwork of small blocks (212.47.x, 194.135.x, 91.135.x, 80.69.x, 92.39.x) accumulated over three decades rather than a single clean allocation.

Notable

  • No PTRs came back on any of the addresses sampled inside the announced prefixes. That is not proof the reverse zones are undelegated, but it does mean the pack gives no direct evidence of subscriber-pool naming. The eyeball classification rests on the operator's role and its single-upstream access shape, so it is held at moderate confidence rather than high.
  • Aztelekom operates more than one AS — AS34170 also carries its name. Traffic and subscribers are split across them, so this AS is not the whole picture of the company's network.
  • The Baku/regions split matters: Aztelekom is deliberately the non-Baku operator, so geolocating this space to the capital would be wrong.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS34170Aztelekom LLC2,572

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-14, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 21 prefixes · 17.15K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
AZAzerbaijan21

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8814
Registry name
AS-AZTELEKOM
Registrant
AZTELEKOM-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@aztelekom.az
Registered
2002-01-22
Last changed
2026-02-12
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 43 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
43 authorising AS8814
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 43 of 43 announcements
Route objects
43 naming AS8814

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check