asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8771 YUNET-AS

Residential RIPE

IPv4 addresses 68.61K 11 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RS
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

EUnet Serbia (YUnet International)

Serbia · AI-generated

isp residential legacy

YUnet International d.o.o. (YUNET-AS) — the Belgrade company behind

EUnet Serbia, one of the country's oldest internet providers. The AS is

registered to YUnet; the network answers to eunet.rs.

What it's used for

  • Consumer internet access. Roughly 64,000 IPv4 addresses, and the rDNS is unambiguous subscriber naming: dynamic-IP-ADDR.adsl.eunet.rs across most of the space, with an older dynamic-IP-ADDR.dial.eunet.rs zone still lit on the legacy 213.240.0.0/19.
  • The blocks are large and contiguous (213.198.192.0/18, 78.30.128.0/18, 194.247.192.0/19) — the shape of an incumbent-era ISP that was allocated address space in bulk, not one that assembled it later.

Notable

  • This is an eyeball network: the addresses sit behind home DSL lines, not servers. The dial/adsl labels name the access technology of the subscriber termination, which is the honest signal for what the space carries.
  • Only one observed BGP upstream despite the size, which is what a retail ISP that buys transit rather than selling it looks like.

Interesting

  • The YU in YUnet is Yugoslavia. The company's name and its AS number both predate the country's dissolution, and the .rs domain the network now uses did not exist until 2007 — the AS outlived two names for the state it operates in.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Address space

Summary

Full explorer
CountryNamePrefixes
RSSerbia12

Registry

Allocation record

via RIPE RDAP
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8771
Registry name
YUNET-AS
Registrant
AS8771-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@yu.net
Registered
2002-09-11
Last changed
2016-04-14
Status
active

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check