Autonomous system
AS8697 JTC-AS8697 Jordan Telecom Group JTG
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Orange Jordan (Jordan Telecommunications PSC)
isp residential transit legacy
JTC-AS8697 is the main network of Jordan Telecom Group, the country's incumbent fixed-line operator, which trades retail as Orange Jordan. The registry name has drifted over the years (Jordan Telecom Group, then Jordan Telecommunications PSC) but the network is the same one.
What it's used for
- Consumer and business internet for Jordan: ADSL, fibre and mobile broadband under the Orange brand, plus transit for a handful of downstream Jordanian networks. About 17,000 IPv4 addresses across 57 prefixes, and a substantial IPv6 footprint (
2a00:18d8::/29and its sub-blocks). - rDNS is sparsely delegated, but what exists is first-party operator infrastructure: core and access routers (
cr1-tc.jt.net.jo,ar1-jix.jt.net.jo— jix being the Jordanian exchange), a broadband access server (nas1-tla.lan1.jt.net.jo), and customer ranges undergo.com.jo, the group's long-running ISP brand (still its abuse contact). 2.17.24.0/22inside the AS is an on-net Akamai cache cluster (*.deploy.static.akamaitechnologies.com), not Orange address space.
Notable
- Small address count for a national incumbent — Jordan's fixed broadband base is heavily NATed, so subscriber counts are not readable from the prefix size.
- The AS mixes eyeball access, corporate connectivity and downstream transit in one routing identity, so treat any single address here as "Orange Jordan customer" rather than confidently residential.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 3 exchanges in 3 countries, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| DE-CIX Frankfurt | Frankfurt, Germany | 80.81.196.44 |
| UAE-IX | Dubai, United Arab Emirates | 185.1.8.20 |
| Manama-IX | Manama, Bahrain | 77.69.248.111 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 14 prefixes · 17.41K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| JO | Jordan | 15 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8697- Registry name
- JTC-AS8697
- Registrant
- AS8697-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@go.com.jo
- Registered
- 2002-01-13
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 84 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 20 authorising AS8697
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 84 of 84 announcements
- Route objects
- 2,806 naming AS8697
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere