Autonomous system
AS8672 A1
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
A1 Bulgaria
telecom legacy
AS8672 is registered to A1 Bulgaria EAD, the Bulgarian arm of the A1 Telekom Austria Group (founded in 1994 as Mobiltel, acquired by mobilkom austria in 2005, renamed A1 in 2018). It is not A1's main network — it is an ancillary, near-dormant registration.
What it's used for
Very little. The AS currently announces a single /24 (256 addresses) with one observed BGP neighbour — A1's own main network, AS8717. The 212.95.160.0/19 that first put this AS in the routing table in 2000 is no longer announced from it.
That lone prefix is not A1's own space in any meaningful sense. In the RIPE database 151.251.39.0/24 carries netname: Min_tour, descr: Ministry of tourism, Republic Bulgaria, status: ASSIGNED PA — a customer assignment carved out of A1's 151.251.0.0/16, still maintained under ORBITEL-NOC (Orbitel being one of the Bulgarian ISPs A1 absorbed). The reverse zone is delegated to ns.a1.bg but publishes no PTRs.
A1 Bulgaria's real networks live elsewhere — its consumer broadband, mobile and business services are carried by its other, far larger autonomous systems. AS8672 is best read as a legacy number kept alive to originate one customer route.
Notable
The public data actively points the wrong way here: the holder is a household mobile/broadband brand, and third-party sources tag the AS "Eyeball" and "Home ISP" on the strength of that name. The inventory says otherwise. The only thing this AS carries is a single government customer assignment, so inheriting "mobile" or "residential" from the parent brand would label 256 addresses on the basis of who holds the number rather than what the addresses do.
It is left unclassified. It is not A1's eyeball footprint, and it is not really a government network either — it is a carrier's leftover AS originating one ministry's PA block.
Interesting
Bulgaria's telecoms market consolidated hard in the 2010s, and A1 absorbed several independent ISPs and cable operators along the way. Leftover AS numbers like this one are the fossil record of that consolidation: the number outlives the company that was issued it, kept in the table because retiring an AS is more trouble than announcing one small prefix from it.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BG | Bulgaria | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8672- Registry name
- A1BG
- Registrant
- ORBITEL-NOC
- Abuse contact
- RIPE.Abuse@a1.bg
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2021-05-27
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere