Autonomous system
AS8639 BTHK
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
BTHK (Information Technologies and Communications Authority)
government regulator legacy
Bilgi Teknolojileri ve Haberleşme Kurumu (BTHK) — the telecommunications and information-technology regulator for Northern Cyprus, based on Rauf Raif Denktaş Caddesi in Nicosia. It licenses operators and regulates tariffs, numbering, spectrum and equipment conformity under the local electronic communications law.
What it's used for
- The authority's own network and services. It announces a single
185.121.20.0/22allocation, registered directly to the organisation asCY-BTHK-20151012with countryCY— the regulator's own address space, not a pool of end users. - There is no public rDNS on the block, which is consistent with a small government body's internal estate rather than a service network.
Notable
- This is a government kind despite the telecom subject matter. BTHK regulates the operators; it does not sell connectivity, and none of its space carries subscriber, DSL or dynamic naming.
- Small by design: roughly 1,024 addresses is enough for one agency and nothing more.
Interesting
- The low AS number is misleading here. The organisation object, the AS assignment and the
/22all date from October 2015, so AS8639 is a reissued number rather than an early-internet allocation. The20151012embedded in the netname is the allocation date, not a legacy artefact.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS9121 | Turk Telekomunikasyon Anonim Sirketi | 58 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 1.02K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| CY | Cyprus | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8639- Registry name
- BTHK
- Registrant
- cy-bthk-1-mnt
- Abuse contact
- info@bthk.org
- Registered
- 2015-10-13
- Last changed
- 2018-09-04
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- BTHK
- Scope
- Not Disclosed
- Traffic ratio
- Not Disclosed
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1 authorising AS8639
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS8639
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere