asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8628 KRM-AS

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BG
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Kremak

Bulgaria · AI-generated

enterprise legacy

KRM-AS — Kremak EOOD, a Bulgarian physical and technical security company based in Stara Zagora. It guards industrial sites and runs alarm and video surveillance monitoring across the country.

What it's used for

  • The company's own network, and nothing else. The AS announces a single /24 (109.121.133.0/24, 256 addresses) with one BGP neighbour.
  • The prefix is ASSIGNED PA space handed down from a Bulgarian LIR, registered with the netname BG-KREMAK and the same individual as both admin and tech contact — a small in-house network team.
  • No rDNS is published on the block.

Notable

  • Enterprise address space, not a service provider's. An AS number here buys address portability and BGP at the edge for a company whose business depends on a monitoring centre staying reachable, not on selling connectivity.
  • This is roughly the smallest inventory an announced AS can have: one /24, one upstream, no IPv6.

Interesting

  • The AS number is a low one, but the registry gives no reliable evidence about when it was first issued, so no early-internet claim is made here. What the registry does say is plain: a security firm, one /24, one link.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS41313"NOVATEL" EOOD60

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-16, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
BGBulgaria1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8628
Registry name
KRM-AS
Registrant
KREMAK
Abuse contact
r.bonchev@kremak.com
Registered
2015-10-14
Last changed
2020-11-16
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS8628
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS8628

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,783 prefixes, as published 2026-10-17. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check