asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8588 JD_ABRA_EU-AS Abra S.A.

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly PL
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Abra (Polish furniture retailer)

Poland · AI-generated

enterprise retail legacy

Abra S.A. (JD_ABRA_EU-AS), a furniture retail chain founded in Kraków in 1990 and one of the largest in Poland, with stores across dozens of Polish cities. The JD in the handle refers to JD Group, the South African retail group that owned Abra before the Steinhoff era.

What it's used for

  • Corporate networking for a retailer: a single /24, 91.208.133.0/24, whose sampled reverse DNS is bgp1.abra.krakow.pl — the company's own border router in Kraków.
  • Head-office and store-network connectivity, not public hosting and not consumer access.

Notable

  • 256 addresses and one observed neighbour. This is the smallest kind of real network: an enterprise that wanted provider-independent space and its own AS number for multi-homing or resilience, nothing more.
  • The RIS first-seen record for this AS points at 143.177.0.0/16, a block it no longer originates. Only the single /24 is announced today.

Interesting

  • The handle is a fossil of a corporate ownership chain: JD Group acquired Abra, Steinhoff International later absorbed JD Group, and the AS name still carries the first of those owners.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS52142Polcom Sp. z o.o.64

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-07, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
PLPoland1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8588
Registry name
JD_ABRA_EU-AS
Registrant
Abra S.A.
Abuse contact
abuse@abra-meble.pl
Registered
2008-09-08
Last changed
2018-09-04
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 1 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS8588
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
1 naming AS8588

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 454 networks and 1,852 prefixes, as published 2026-11-08. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check