asn.dev

Routing security

AS8580 SANDY MTS Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 20 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8580 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
5.227.0.0/18No ROAIRR covering52
5.227.0.0/21No ROAIRR51
5.227.16.0/23No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.24.0/22No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.40.0/22No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.44.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.45.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.46.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.47.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.52.0/23No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.54.0/23No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.64.0/19No ROAIRR covering51
5.227.112.0/22No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.116.0/23No ROAIRR covering50
5.227.128.0/19No ROAIRR covering51
62.220.32.0/20No ROAIRR51
194.190.177.0/24No ROAIRR50
194.190.180.0/22No ROAIRR50
194.190.184.0/22No ROAIRR50
194.190.188.0/23No ROAIRR50

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8580 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 7 not announced

Route objects naming AS8580 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
5.227.0.0/17RIPEMTS Nizhniy Novgorod Stream network blockMTU-NOC2020-07-24Not announced
5.227.103.0/24RIPEMTS-NAT1-POOL1AS8580-MNT2014-10-14Not announced
5.227.128.0/18RIPEStream network blockMTU-NOC2024-12-09Not announced
81.23.168.0/22RIPEMTS Nizhniy NovgorodMTU-NOC2020-04-21Not announced
81.23.174.0/24RIPEMTS Nizhniy NovgorodMTU-NOC2020-04-21Not announced
195.122.250.0/24RIPEru.sandy, home customersAS8580-MNT2006-10-30Not announced
195.122.251.0/24RIPEru.sandy, home customersAS8580-MNT2007-01-25Not announced
5.227.0.0/21RIPEMTS Nizhny NovgorodAS8580-MNT2016-01-21Announced
62.220.32.0/20RIPEStream network blockAS8580-MNT2008-10-17Announced
194.190.177.0/24RIPEMobile TeleSystems PJSCROSNIIROS-MNT2020-03-04Announced
194.190.180.0/22RIPEMobile TeleSystems PJSCROSNIIROS-MNT2020-03-04Announced
194.190.184.0/22RIPEMobile TeleSystems PJSCROSNIIROS-MNT2020-03-04Announced
194.190.188.0/23RIPEMobile TeleSystems PJSCROSNIIROS-MNT2020-03-04Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8580 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BLOCK-SETRIPELists AS8580 as a direct member
AS-BLOCKED-RURIPELists AS8580 as a direct member
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS8580 as a direct member
AS-SANDYRIPELists AS8580 as a direct member
AS-SANDY-PVTRIPELists AS8580 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-13 12:16 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.