asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8570 LES OJSC Lipetskelectrosvyaz

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 23.55K 10 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Rostelecom (Lipetsk, ex-Lipetskelectrosvyaz)

Russia · AI-generated

isp broadband legacy

LES is PJSC Rostelecom's Lipetsk-region network. The handle preserves

Lipetskelectrosvyaz, the regional incumbent telephone operator that was folded

into CentreTelecom and then into Rostelecom during the consolidation of Russia's

regional telcos.

What it's used for

  • Regional fixed access and telephony-derived internet service in Lipetsk Oblast: roughly 108,000 IPv4 addresses across 21 prefixes, mostly 178.234.0.0/16 and 95.179.0.0/18, plus older 195.34.x incumbent space.
  • One observed neighbour: the AS hangs off Rostelecom's backbone and sells no transit of its own.

Notable

  • No PTRs came back on the addresses sampled inside the announced prefixes. That is not proof the reverse zones are undelegated, but it does mean the usual subscriber-pool naming cannot be confirmed from rDNS alone here.
  • Announced prefixes overlap heavily (for example 178.234.0.0/16 alongside 178.234.0.0/17 and 178.234.0.0/18), a common pattern where a regional operator deaggregates its own space.

Interesting

  • Regional Russian incumbents were named REGIONelectrosvyaz (literally "electro-communication"), and the abbreviations survive in AS handles long after the companies themselves were merged away. LES is one of them.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Address space

Summary

Full explorer
CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation10

Registry

Allocation record

via RIPE RDAP
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8570
Registry name
LES
Registrant
PJSC Rostelecom
Abuse contact
abuse@rt.ru
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2025-04-15
Status
active

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check