asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8557 ELKATEL-AS PJSC Rostelecom

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 8.19K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

PJSC Rostelecom (Elkatel), Moscow

Russia · AI-generated

isp legacy

ELKATEL-AS is registered to PJSC Rostelecom, Moscow branch, but the handle names its original owner: Elkatel (ЗАО «Элкател»), a Moscow-region internet provider that Rostelecom absorbed. The AS number and the address block stayed with the acquiring carrier while the brand faded.

What it's used for

Access networking in Moscow and Moscow oblast under Rostelecom's regional branch, inherited from Elkatel's own subscriber network. The routed footprint is small and entirely legacy: five overlapping prefixes carved out of one 195.18.32.0/19 (about 8,192 addresses), no IPv6, and a single observed BGP neighbour — a leaf network hanging off its parent carrier rather than an independent operator.

The addresses sampled inside the announced prefixes returned no PTRs. That does not mean the reverse zone is undelegated; it means nothing resolved at the points probed, so the current use of the block is not directly evidenced here. The identification as subscriber access rests on Elkatel's history as a home-internet ISP and on Rostelecom's Moscow branch as the successor, not on the reverse DNS.

Notable

  • Handles outlive their holders: this one has been Rostelecom space for years while still announcing itself as Elkatel.
  • The /19 announced as itself and re-announced as four constituent /21s is a common Russian traffic-engineering pattern, not a sign of separate networks.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS25515PJSC Rostelecom310

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-11-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8557
Registry name
ELKATEL-AS
Registrant
ELKATEL-NCC
Abuse contact
abuse@rt.ru
Registered
2002-07-10
Last changed
2025-04-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 5 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
5 authorising AS8557
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 5 of 5 announcements
Route objects
31 naming AS8557

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 453 networks and 1,846 prefixes, as published 2026-11-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check