Autonomous system
AS8557 ELKATEL-AS PJSC Rostelecom. Moscow branch
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
PJSC Rostelecom (Elkatel), Moscow
isp legacy
ELKATEL-AS is registered to PJSC Rostelecom, Moscow branch, but the handle names its original owner: Elkatel (ЗАО «Элкател»), a Moscow-region internet provider that Rostelecom absorbed. The AS number and the address block stayed with the acquiring carrier while the brand faded.
What it's used for
Access networking in Moscow and Moscow oblast under Rostelecom's regional branch, inherited from Elkatel's own subscriber network. The routed footprint is small and entirely legacy: five overlapping prefixes carved out of one 195.18.32.0/19 (about 8,192 addresses), no IPv6, and a single observed BGP neighbour — a leaf network hanging off its parent carrier rather than an independent operator.
The addresses sampled inside the announced prefixes returned no PTRs. That does not mean the reverse zone is undelegated; it means nothing resolved at the points probed, so the current use of the block is not directly evidenced here. The identification as subscriber access rests on Elkatel's history as a home-internet ISP and on Rostelecom's Moscow branch as the successor, not on the reverse DNS.
Notable
- Handles outlive their holders: this one has been Rostelecom space for years while still announcing itself as Elkatel.
- The
/19announced as itself and re-announced as four constituent/21s is a common Russian traffic-engineering pattern, not a sign of separate networks.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8557- Registry name
- ELKATEL-AS
- Registrant
- ELKATEL-NCC
- Abuse contact
- abuse@rt.ru
- Registered
- 2002-07-10
- Last changed
- 2025-04-15
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere