asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8511 AS8511-AI Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

Unclassified APNIC

IPv4 addresses 8.19K 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly KG
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 1 2 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

AsiaInfo

Kyrgyzstan · AI-generated

isp business legacy

AS8511-AI is operated by AsiaInfo LLC (ОсОО «Азия Инфо»), an internet service provider and IT company in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Alongside connectivity it sells hosting, .kg domain registration and IT services to Kyrgyz organisations.

What it's used for

  • A single 195.38.160.0/19 (about 8,000 addresses) plus one IPv6 /29, carrying AsiaInfo's customer access, its own servers, and hosting for customer sites.
  • Access circuits for offices and institutions in Bishkek, terminated on the provider's concentrators.

Notable

  • rDNS is first-party throughout (asiainfo.kg): hosting boxes (ai-prohost, vs1), the office gateway, numbered workstation names, and blocks of vpdn-pool-NNN.asiainfo.kg. The vpdn label names the access technology — a PPP/tunnelled access concentrator — not a VPN product, and not necessarily households.
  • There is no dsl-, dyn- or home-broadband naming anywhere in the block, and named hosts in the space belong to organisations, including a Kyrgyz government system (usis.gov.kg) and a Bishkek VoIP service. The inventory therefore reads as a business/institutional ISP rather than a consumer eyeball network, though the pooled ranges could include some residential subscribers.

Interesting

  • AsiaInfo is one of the veteran names of Kyrgyz networking, long associated with the country's .kg domain ecosystem — which is why a small Bishkek provider holds a four-digit AS number.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

1 upstream, 2 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS61010IPNET OOO98

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-23, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 8.19K addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
KGKyrgyzstan2

Registry

Allocation record

APNIC · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
APNIC
Handle
AS8511
Registry name
AS8511-AI
Registrant
AS8511-MNT
Abuse contact
evgeni@infotel.kg
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2026-05-25
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
2 authorising AS8511
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
4 naming AS8511

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check