asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8507 Moscow, Russia

Unclassified ARIN

IPv4 addresses 7.68K 8 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly RU
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 3 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

LANIT

Russia · AI-generated

enterprise legacy

AS8507 is held by JSC "Laboratory of New Information Technologies" (LANIT), one of Russia's largest IT systems integrators and hardware distributors, based in Moscow. The registry name that ships with this AS in some datasets is just a city line — the actual holder is the LANIT group.

What it's used for

  • LANIT's own corporate network and the internet-facing services of its group companies: mail, DNS, VPN concentrators, commerce portals and internal application servers.
  • Roughly 7,700 addresses announced as thirty consecutive 195.26.16x–19x /24s — one contiguous legacy block sliced for internal routing, not a scattered inventory.

Notable

  • rDNS is uniformly first-party: lanit.ru on the bulk of it (including firewall and switch names such as asa20-10-1 and cb3500-1-195-161), plus treolan.ru — Treolan is LANIT's IT-distribution subsidiary — and lantel.ru. Some hosts sit under a lan.lanit.ru sub-zone, i.e. internal systems that kept public addresses.
  • There is no subscriber, DSL, PPPoE or dynamic-pool naming, and only three observed BGP neighbours. This is an enterprise's own multihomed network, not a service-provider network, despite the size of the group.

Interesting

  • The contiguous /19-sized legacy allocation and the low AS number both date to the mid-1990s, when large Russian technology companies obtained address space directly rather than through a service provider.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

3 upstream, 0 downstream and 3 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS12389PJSC Rostelecom1,320
AS3216PJSC "Vimpelcom"412
AS25227JSC "ER-Telecom Holding"120

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-20, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 8 prefixes · 7.68K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
RURussian Federation8

Registry

Allocation record

ARIN · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS8507
Registry name
UNSPECIFIED
Registrant
AS8507-MNT
Abuse contact
dns@lanit.ru
Registered
1970-01-01
Last changed
2024-05-06
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 30 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS8507
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 30 of 30 announcements
Route objects
32 naming AS8507

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-21. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check