asn.dev

Routing security

AS8469 PIRONETNDH-AS CANCOM Managed Services GmbH

Hosting RIPE Cable/DSL/ISP

RPKI valid 100% 14 of 14 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 14 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

14 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8469 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a00:5f40::/29RPKI validIRR31
5.61.80.0/21RPKI validIRR53
62.40.0.0/19RPKI validIRR53
80.87.160.0/20RPKI validIRR53
185.32.32.0/22RPKI validIRR53
185.64.96.0/22RPKI validIRR53
193.41.121.0/24RPKI validIRR53
195.82.64.0/19RPKI validIRR53
195.82.80.0/24RPKI validIRR54
195.94.64.0/19RPKI validIRR53
195.135.128.0/18RPKI validIRR53
195.227.0.0/16RPKI validIRR53
212.237.160.0/21RPKI validIRR53
2001:1440::/32RPKI validIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

14 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8469 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
5.61.80.0/21/24RIPENCC
62.40.0.0/19/24RIPENCC
80.87.160.0/20/24RIPENCC
185.32.32.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.64.96.0/22/22RIPENCC
193.41.121.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.82.64.0/19/24RIPENCC
195.82.80.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.94.64.0/19/24RIPENCC
195.135.128.0/18/24RIPENCC
195.227.0.0/16/24RIPENCC
212.237.160.0/21/24RIPENCC
2001:1440::/32/32RIPENCC
2a00:5f40::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

14 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS8469 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
5.61.80.0/21RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-09Announced
62.40.0.0/19RIPEDE-PIRONET-970502PIRONET-MNT2003-05-22Announced
80.87.160.0/20RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-09Announced
185.32.32.0/22RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-09Announced
185.64.96.0/22RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-12Announced
193.41.121.0/24RIPEDBSG-DE-NETPIRONET-MNT2019-02-21Announced
195.82.64.0/19RIPEDE-PIRONET-970217PIRONET-MNT2003-05-22Announced
195.82.80.0/24RIPEDE-PIRONET-970217PIRONET-MNT2016-07-21Announced
195.94.64.0/19RIPEDE-PIRONET-970220PIRONET-MNT2003-05-22Announced
195.135.128.0/18RIPEDE-PIRONET-990316PIRONET-MNT2003-05-22Announced
195.227.0.0/16RIPEDE-PIRONET-971119PIRONET-MNT2003-05-22Announced
212.237.160.0/21RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-09Announced
2001:1440::/32RIPEDE-PIRONET-20030530PIRONET-MNT2007-10-12Announced
2a00:5f40::/29RIPE—PIRONET-MNT2021-02-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8469 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-PIRONETNDHPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-DDITS:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-DOCLER:AS-PEERSRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-EUNDERIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-FINECOM-PEERS-DECIXRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-DECIX-PEERS-V4RIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-MANDA-DECIX-PEERS-V6RIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-MYRASECRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-PIRONETNDHRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS-TITANDECIXRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS203462:AS-NVC-DECIX_FRA_RSRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-CONNECTEDRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-RSRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS6695:AS-DECIX-FRA-RS-V6RIPELists AS8469 as a direct member
AS8308:AS-PEERINGSRIPELists AS8469 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.