asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8461 ASN-TEX-KYIV

Unclassified RIPE

IPv4 addresses 512 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly UA
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Astelnet

Ukraine · AI-generated

isp legacy

Astelnet LLC (ASN-TEX-KYIV) — a small Kyiv-based network operator. The AS announces one provider-independent /23 (512 addresses).

What it's used for

  • The prefix is in service and fully named, but the reverse DNS belongs to a different company: every sampled address resolves as NN-216.mobicom.net.ua, the domain of Mobicom, a Kyiv telecom that rents fibre channels and sells data transmission and internet access.
  • So the registered holder and the operator visible in DNS are not the same entity. The space is being used by, or on behalf of, Mobicom.

Notable

  • The holder-versus-rDNS mismatch is the main thing to know about this AS. It is not the address-broker pattern — one prefix, one RIR, coherent sequential naming across the whole range — but the registrant's name is not a safe label for the addresses.
  • The /23 was registered to Astelnet only recently, which is consistent with a transfer of an existing, already-in-use block rather than a fresh deployment.
  • Tiny: 512 addresses and a couple of BGP neighbours.

Interesting

  • The handle ASN-TEX-KYIV matches neither the current holder nor the network in the reverse DNS — a third name, from a third era. Old RIPE handles are archaeology, not identification.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS24593Astelnet LLC52
AS34251LLC IMC13

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-23, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
UAUkraine1

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS8461
Registry name
ASN-TEX-KYIV
Registrant
ASTELNET-KYIV-MNT
Abuse contact
noc@astelnet.com.ua
Registered
2002-10-07
Last changed
2026-01-16
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
ROAs
1 authorising AS8461
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
Route objects
3 naming AS8461

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,779 prefixes, as published 2026-10-24. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check