Autonomous system
AS8437 UTA-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Hutchison Drei Austria (UTA)
isp mobile eyeball legacy
Hutchison Drei Austria GmbH (UTA-AS) — the network of "Drei", Austria's Hutchison-owned mobile and fixed operator. The UTA handle is a leftover from UTA Telekom, the alternative carrier that passed through Tele2 Austria before Drei absorbed it.
What it's used for
- Subscriber access for Drei's Austrian customers. The bulk of the sampled address space resolves as
IP-ADDR.wireless.dyn.drei.com— dynamic mobile and fixed-wireless pools — with a smaller slice ofIP-ADDR.dsl.dyn.drei.comfixed broadband.
Notable
- An "eyeball" network: these are end-user devices, not servers, and the addresses are mostly dynamic.
- A handle trap.
UTA-ASreads like the old UTA business/fixed carrier, but the rDNS shows the AS today carries Drei's consumer access traffic, predominantly wireless.
Interesting
- Austria's fixed-alternative carriers consolidated hard: UTA into Tele2, Tele2 into Drei. The AS number and its handle survived all of it, which is why a mobile-first operator answers to a fixed-line carrier's name.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 95 prefixes · 550K addresses IPv6 67 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AT | Austria | 162 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8437- Registry name
- UTA-AS
- Registrant
- AS12635-MNT
- Abuse contact
- abuse@drei.com
- Registered
- 2002-09-19
- Last changed
- 2026-07-02
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 95% valid · 121 valid, 5 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 89 authorising AS8437
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 128 of 128 announcements
- Route objects
- 99 naming AS8437
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,782 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere