Autonomous system
AS8393 ASTEL-AS Alma-Ata
Unclassified RIPE NSP
Summary
Astel
isp legacy
ASTEL-AS is JSC Astel, a Kazakh telecom operator headquartered in Almaty and operating since the early 1990s. It is best known as the country's largest VSAT satellite operator, and it sells corporate connectivity, telephony and internet across Kazakhstan and neighbouring Central Asian states.
What it's used for
- Corporate and enterprise connectivity. The registry says so plainly: prefixes carry netnames and descriptions like Customers of ASTEL in Pavlodar, and others are city-scoped to places such as Shymkent, which is how a business ISP labels the blocks it assigns to customer sites.
- Satellite links to remote sites, which in Kazakhstan means oil and gas fields, mining, banking branches and government offices far from any fibre.
- Cloud and datacentre services, visible as a prefix simply netnamed
iaas.
Notable
- A business-focused ISP, not an eyeball network. The inventory is about 80 scattered
/24s and roughly 21,000 addresses, the shape of an operator handing small blocks to many corporate sites rather than running consumer pools. - There is no published reverse DNS across the space, so the netnames are the evidence here rather than host naming.
- The scattered
/24s across several RIPE ranges could be mistaken for an address-broker inventory, but they are not: the blocks are consistently Kazakhstan-registered under the operator's own LIR, with coherent city and customer descriptions.
Interesting
- Satellite-first operators are the exception rather than the rule, and they exist where geography makes terrestrial networks impractical. Kazakhstan, with an area larger than Western Europe and a very low population density, is exactly that.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| KazNIX | Semey, Kazakhstan | 185.79.213.6 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-11, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 10 prefixes · 21.76K addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| KZ | Kazakhstan | 10 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8393- Registry name
- ASTEL-AS
- Registrant
- ASTEL-MNT
- Abuse contact
- i.rodenko@freedomsat.kz
- Registered
- 2002-09-10
- Last changed
- 2021-03-09
- Allocation
- allocated
Declared
PeeringDB profile
- Name
- ASTEL JSC
- Also known as
- ASTEL JSC
- Network type
- NSP
- Scope
- Asia Pacific
- Traffic ratio
- Mostly Inbound
- Peering policy
- Open
- IRR as-set
AS-ASTELPEERS- Present at
- 1 exchanges
- Facilities
- 1 facilities
- Website
- http://www.astel.kz/
PeeringDB records are maintained by the network operator and are not independently verified. Treat them as a statement of intent rather than of fact. For the observed and recorded view, see peering, which lists the exchanges Packet Clearing House has a port on file for.
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 99% valid · 80 valid, 1 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 80 authorising AS8393
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 81 of 81 announcements
- Route objects
- 109 naming AS8393
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 432 networks and 1,768 prefixes, as published 2026-10-12. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere