Autonomous system
AS8381 BAYDAR-AS
Unclassified RIPE
Summary
Baydar
isp legacy
BAYDAR-AS is a very small internet provider serving the Baydar valley, the rural area inland from Balaklava in the Sevastopol region of Crimea. It is registered to a sole trader, and both the AS and its addresses were registered in 2015.
What it's used for
- Local access internet in and around the village of Orlinoe: homes, holiday houses, and small offices, sold alongside IPTV and camera systems, which is the usual bundle for a village operator of this size.
- Announcing a single
95.46.2.0/23, roughly 500 addresses, behind one upstream.
Notable
- An eyeball network, but a tiny one. Two /24s worth of space and a single transit provider is about as small as a routed ISP gets. There is no published reverse DNS on the block, so the subscriber pools are not visible from outside.
- The registry places the holder in Orlinoe, Sevastopol, with a Russian country code. The Crimean context is worth stating plainly rather than implying: the operator is registered under RU and routed through Russian upstreams.
Interesting
- The low AS number is not early-internet pedigree. The AS number, the address block and the organisation object were all created on the same day in October 2015, so this is a reissued number that happened to land with a village ISP. The name comes straight from the valley it serves.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 1 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS201776 | Miranda-Media Ltd | 61 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-26, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8381- Registry name
- BAYDAR-AS
- Registrant
- PE Pusko Iliya Viktorovich
- Abuse contact
- info@baydarlan.ru
- Registered
- 2015-10-16
- Last changed
- 2026-05-06
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 1 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 1 authorising AS8381
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 1 of 1 announcements
- Route objects
- 1 naming AS8381
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 445 networks and 1,817 prefixes, as published 2026-10-27. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere