asn.dev

Routing security

AS8345 DSI-IAS JSC "ER-Telecom Holding"

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 21 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 21 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

21 observed

Every prefix observed with AS8345 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
84.244.48.0/20No ROAIRR53
91.185.32.0/19No ROAIRR53
91.185.33.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.44.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.45.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.52.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.53.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.54.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.55.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.56.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.57.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.58.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.59.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.60.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.61.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.62.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
91.185.63.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
185.46.12.0/22No ROAIRR53
195.206.32.0/19No ROAIRR53
195.206.43.0/24No ROAIRR53
195.206.45.0/24No ROAIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS8345 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 8 not announced

Route objects naming AS8345 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
84.244.56.0/22RIPEDSI CUSTOMERSAS8345-MNT2017-10-31Not announced
84.244.58.0/23RIPEDSI networkSIBTELECOM-MNT2016-12-21Not announced
84.244.58.0/24RIPEDSI networkSIBTELECOM-MNT2016-12-21Not announced
84.244.59.0/24RIPEDSI network Angarsk PPPoE staticSIBTELECOM-MNT2016-12-21Not announced
84.244.60.128/26RIPE—AS8345-MNT2016-09-07Not announced
91.185.36.0/23RIPEADSL in Baikalsk, SludyankaAS8345-MNT2017-04-14Not announced
91.185.48.0/22RIPEDelovaya Set' - IrkutskAS8345-MNT2007-01-22Not announced
195.206.37.0/24RIPE—AS8345-MNT2016-04-15Not announced
84.244.48.0/20RIPEDSIAS8345-MNT2011-02-02Announced
91.185.32.0/19RIPEDelovaya Set' - IrkutskAS8345-MNT2006-10-20Announced
185.46.12.0/22RIPE—AS8345-MNT2016-04-15Announced
195.206.32.0/19RIPEDelovaya Set' - IrkutskAS8345-MNT2001-09-22Announced
195.206.43.0/24RIPEIRKNET ACCESS NETWORKAS8345-MNT2009-02-24Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS8345 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BLOCK-SETRIPELists AS8345 as a direct member
AS-BLOCKED-RURIPELists AS8345 as a direct member
AS-BTN-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS8345 as a direct member
AS-DSIJSCRIPELists AS8345 as a direct member
AS-MEGATELECOM-PEERSRIPELists AS8345 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS8345 as a direct member
AS209141:AS-RUCUSTRADBLists AS8345 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-07 13:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-07. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.