Autonomous system
AS8334 CO-2COM-AS Moscow
Residential RIPE
Summary
2COM / Teleport Telecom
isp residential legacy
CO-2COM-AS is the network of 2COM (also branded 2KOM), a Moscow broadband
provider. The AS is registered to JSC "Teleport Telecom", the Moscow operator that
now holds it; the 2COM brand is still what the network's addressing carries.
What it's used for
- Residential broadband in Moscow. The dominant reverse-DNS pattern across the announced space is
broadband-A-B-C-D.2com.netandbroadband-A-B-C-D.2kom.ru, applied across whole/24s and/20s. That is subscriber-pool naming, and it covers the large majority of the roughly 50k addresses this AS announces. - A smaller amount of office and server addressing resolves under
2com.netdirectly (ws-NN,office, mail and web hosts), which is the operator's own infrastructure. - The inventory is a mix of an older
195.98.160.0/19and a large modern spread across46.188.0.0/17,176.32.240.0/20and188.244.32.0/20.
Notable
- Eyeball network. Addresses here belong to Moscow subscribers. Geolocate to Moscow; expect consumer traffic patterns and dynamic reassignment.
- The AS name in the registry is just
CO-2COM-ASwith the remarkMoscow / Russia, which tells you nothing. The rDNS is the honest witness, and it is unambiguous.
Interesting
- Two brand spellings, transliterated both ways, coexist in the reverse DNS of a single network:
2com.netfor most of it and2kom.rufor one block. It is the same operator, and treating them as two different networks would be a mistake.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| RU | Russian Federation | 44 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8334- Registry name
- CO-2COM-AS
- Registrant
- lir-ru-joint-stock1-1-MNT
- Abuse contact
- info@tptel.ru
- Registered
- 1970-01-01
- Last changed
- 2026-04-29
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere