Autonomous system
AS8193 BRM-AS
Residential RIPE
Summary
Uzbektelekom
isp broadband legacy
BRM-AS is the main retail Autonomous System of Uzbektelekom JSC, Uzbekistan's state-owned national telecommunications incumbent. It is the country's largest eyeball network.
What it's used for
- Consumer and small-business internet access across Uzbekistan — fixed broadband and the retail side of the incumbent's network.
- Announces on the order of a hundred prefixes, built around
213.230.64.0/18plus a spread of RIPE/22s and/23s.
Notable
- An IP here is normally an Uzbek end user, not a server. Uzbektelekom runs other Autonomous Systems for transit and upstream duties, and this is the one its subscribers sit behind.
- Reverse DNS is thin and mechanical where it exists — hosts in the
213.230.64.0/18block resolve as10.64.uzpak.uz,20.64.uzpak.uzand so on, numbering by octet rather than by customer.UzPAKwas the old Uzbek national packet-data network, absorbed into Uzbektelekom.
Interesting
- The AS also announces a couple of ARIN-registered
/24s alongside its RIPE space, an unusual mix for a national incumbent and a reminder that a network's address inventory can cross registries.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-15, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 63 prefixes · 65.28K addresses IPv6 21 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| UZ | Uzbekistan | 84 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- RIPE
- Handle
AS8193- Registry name
- BRM-AS
- Registrant
- AS8193-MNT
- Abuse contact
- ripe@bkm.uz
- Registered
- 2002-08-01
- Last changed
- 2018-10-10
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 98% valid · 102 valid, 0 with no ROA 2 RPKI-invalid
- ROAs
- 129 authorising AS8193
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 97% registered · 101 of 104 announcements 1 other origin
- Route objects
- 272 naming AS8193
Reputation
Classification and threat
Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,781 prefixes, as published 2026-10-16. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere