asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS8014 BATELNET

Residential ARIN

IPv4 addresses 41.47K 14 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 0 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly BS
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Bahamas Telecommunications Company (BTC)

Bahamas · AI-generated

isp residential legacy

BATELNET — the network of the Bahamas Telecommunications Company, the

incumbent telecommunications operator of The Bahamas. Registered with ARIN in

1996 under the corporation's older name, it is the country's principal eyeball

network.

What it's used for

  • Residential and business internet access across the Bahamian islands, plus the operator's mobile and fixed-line services.
  • BTC's own hosting, mail and DNS for its subscribers.

Notable

  • Reverse DNS settles the kind: addresses resolve as d-63-245-112-1.batelnet.bs — a dynamic subscriber naming pattern, one host per address, under the operator's own .bs domain. This is an access network.
  • The inventory is a patchwork of ARIN blocks (204.236.64.0/18 fragments, 63.245.112.0/20, 108.60.224.0/19, 216.137.0.0/21, 104.166.32.0/20) registered to BTC and its predecessor entities, announced as roughly 24 prefixes and ~41k addresses. Small in absolute terms, but this is a 400,000-person country.
  • Only a handful of BGP neighbours: an island incumbent buys transit from a couple of mainland carriers and does not need to peer widely.

Interesting

  • The .bs reverse names carry the older BaTelNet brand, which is where the ASN handle comes from. Like most handles, it has outlived the branding.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Address space

Summary

Full explorer
CountryNamePrefixes
BSBahamas14

Registry

Allocation record

via ARIN RDAP
Registry
ARIN
Handle
AS8014
Registry name
BATELNET
Registrant
Bahamas Telecommunications Corporation
Abuse contact
nobody@example.com
Registered
1996-08-26
Last changed
1996-08-26
Status
active

Reputation

Classification and threat

Residential Fixed-line consumer ISP. Addresses here are homes.

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check