Autonomous system
AS7699 CTL-AS-AP Cabos de Timor-Leste, E.P.
Unclassified ARIN
Summary
Cabos de Timor-Leste, E.P.
transit government legacy
CTL-AS-AP is Cabos de Timor-Leste, E.P., the state-owned enterprise that operates Timor-Leste's submarine cable and national fibre backbone. The E.P. suffix (empresa pública) marks it as a public corporation.
What it's used for
- National wholesale transit. CTL manages the Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable, which links the country to Australia, and the state-owned terrestrial fibre network. Its ASN exists to carry that capacity, not to serve end users.
- Its downstream networks are effectively the country's entire operator list: Timor Telecom, Viettel Timor Leste, Telkom Indonesia International's local arm, and the government's National Directorate of Information and Technology. Upstream it reaches the wider internet via an Australian international backbone.
- It announces a very small amount of address space — a couple of
/24s of its own, plus a block registered to the National Communications Authority of Timor-Leste, the country's telecoms regulator.
Notable
- This is carrier and government infrastructure, not consumer or hosting space. There are no subscriber-style reverse DNS names and, in practice, almost no public reverse DNS at all. Traffic attributed to these addresses is far more likely to be a router or a state institution than a household.
- The AS is best understood as a chokepoint rather than a network: for a country whose international connectivity ran on satellite for years, essentially all Timorese traffic now transits this one state-owned AS.
Interesting
- CTL is a recent creation — the government established it by decree-law to own and run the new cable system once it landed — yet it holds a low, early-generation AS number. The number long predates the company; it did not come with an early-internet pedigree attached.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.
Transit providers
1 upstream, 3 downstream and 4 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS4826 | Vocus Connect International Backbone | 48 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-10, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 512 addresses IPv6 0 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| TL | Timor-Leste | 1 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS7699- Registry name
- CTL-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Cabos de Timor-Leste, E.P.
- Abuse contact
- netdesk@ctl.biz.tl
- Registered
- 2026-03-12
- Last changed
- 2026-03-12
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 0 authorising AS7699
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 0% registered · 0 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 6 naming AS7699
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 431 networks and 1,775 prefixes, as published 2026-10-11. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere