Autonomous system
AS7615 BTIX-AS-AP Bhutan Internet Exchange
Unclassified APNIC
Summary
Bhutan Internet Exchange (BTIX)
exchange legacy
BTIX-AS-AP is the Bhutan Internet Exchange, the national internet exchange point for Bhutan. AS7615 is the exchange's own infrastructure ASN, not a service-provider network.
What it's used for
- Exchange fabric and supporting services. It announces a single IPv4 /24,
103.129.63.0/24, and2001:dea:4001::/48. Reverse DNS in the /24 resolves to exchange infrastructure such asns1.btix.bt. - An IXP exists so that Bhutanese networks can hand traffic to each other locally instead of hairpinning it through transit providers in India or Singapore. Its own address space carries route servers, name servers, management and peering-LAN infrastructure.
Notable
- This is not classified into any customer kind. An IXP has no eyeballs, no hosting tenants and no transit customers of its own; the addresses belong to the exchange's own machines. Treating this space as hosting, transit or ISP would be wrong in each case.
- Volume is tiny by design. A /24 is a normal footprint for a national exchange, and the address count says nothing about how much traffic crosses the fabric.
Interesting
- Bhutan is a small, landlocked market with no direct submarine-cable landing, so all international transit is bought overland. That makes local peering disproportionately valuable: an IXP is one of the few ways to keep domestic traffic domestic and off expensive cross-border circuits.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Interconnection
Peering at a glance
Internet exchanges
Recorded at 1 exchange in 1 country, largest first.
| Exchange | Location | Their address |
|---|---|---|
| Bhutan Internet Exchange | Thimphu, Bhutan | 103.129.62.3 |
Transit providers
1 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.
| AS | Network | Paths seen |
|---|---|---|
| AS38740 | Tashi InfoComm Limited | 89 |
Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-13, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.
Address space
Summary
IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| BT | Bhutan | 2 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- APNIC
- Handle
AS7615- Registry name
- BTIX-AS-AP
- Registrant
- Bhutan Internet Exchange
- Abuse contact
- noc@btix.bt
- Registered
- 2018-09-04
- Last changed
- 2020-09-02
- Allocation
- allocated
Routing security
RPKI and IRR
- RPKI
- 100% valid · 2 valid, 0 with no ROA
- ROAs
- 2 authorising AS7615
- ASPA
- no ASPA record
- IRR
- 100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
- Route objects
- 2 naming AS7615
Reputation
Classification and threat
Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.
Spamhaus DROP
Not on ASN-DROP The network as a whole is not listed.
No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.
Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 442 networks and 1,773 prefixes, as published 2026-10-13. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.
FBI IC3
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere