Autonomous system
AS7578 GSL Global Secure Layer
Hosting ARIN
Summary
Global Secure Layer
transit hosting legacy
Global Secure Layer (GSL), an Australian-owned network operator that sells IP
transit and inline, anycast DDoS mitigation, with points of presence across
Australia, Asia, Europe and North America.
What it's used for
- Carrier IP transit and DDoS-scrubbing for customers whose traffic is routed through GSL's network, plus protected hosting on GSL-assigned addresses.
- The reverse DNS on its space is almost entirely router and backbone infrastructure under
globalsecurelayer.comandgslnetworks.com, with names encoding the site and device role at Equinix and other facilities in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane, Singapore, Tokyo, Guam, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Dallas, Los Angeles and New York.
Notable
- An IP here is network or protected-service infrastructure, not a consumer broadband subscriber. Addresses without a router name resolve to a generic
unknown.globalsecurelayer.com, which is typical of scrubbed or customer-facing space rather than an eyeball pool. - The announced inventory is small (a few thousand IPv4) but is drawn from several registries, which is normal for an operator that runs a global anycast edge rather than a broker signal.
Interesting
- GSL markets specifically to Australian government and public-sector customers on data-sovereignty grounds, so some of the traffic behind this AS is scrubbed government service traffic rather than the operator's own.
This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.
Address space
Summary
| Country | Name | Prefixes |
|---|---|---|
| AU | Australia | 222 |
Registry
Allocation record
- Registry
- ARIN
- Handle
AS7578- Registry name
- GSL
- Registrant
- GSL Networks Pty LTD
- Abuse contact
- noc@gslnetworks.com.au
- Registered
- 2022-06-20
- Last changed
- 2022-06-21
- Status
- active
Reputation
Classification and threat
Hosting Datacenter or cloud provider. Addresses are servers, not people.
No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.
Threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.
Elsewhere