asn.dev

Routing security

AS7165 EQUITABLE HOLDINGS-ASN

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 22 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 22 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

22 observed

Every prefix observed with AS7165 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
141.191.64.0/20No ROAIRR covering53
141.191.64.0/22No ROAIRR covering53
141.191.64.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.64.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.65.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.66.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.66.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.67.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.68.0/22No ROAIRR covering53
141.191.68.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.68.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.69.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.70.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.70.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.71.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.72.0/22No ROAIRR covering53
141.191.72.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.72.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.73.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.74.0/23No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.74.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
141.191.75.0/24No ROAIRR covering51

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS7165 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 12 not announced

Route objects naming AS7165 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
141.191.0.0/16ARINThis is a route object for Equitable's public IP space.MNT-EFLI2026-08-11Not announced
141.191.1.0/24RADBaxausa route objectMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.2.0/24RADBaxausa route objectMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.3.0/24RADBaxausa route objectMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.5.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.6.0/24RADBEquitable Route ObjectMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.16.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.20.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.22.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.32.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.36.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced
141.191.38.0/24RADBRoute object for AXA USAMAINT-AS550022023-11-13Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS7165 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-DEFENSERADBLists AS7165 as a direct member
AS-F5RIPELists AS7165 as a direct member
AS1221:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS7165 as a direct member
AS35280:AS-DEFENSERIPELists AS7165 as a direct member
AS35280:AS-F5RIPELists AS7165 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.