asn.dev

Routing security

AS7 DSTL

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 37% 7 of 19 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 12 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 7 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

19 observed

Every prefix observed with AS7 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
146.80.0.0/16No ROAIRR55
146.80.128.0/19No ROAIRR covering55
146.80.160.0/19No ROAIRR covering55
146.80.192.0/23No ROAIRR covering54
146.80.194.0/23No ROAIRR covering54
146.80.224.0/20No ROAIRR covering55
146.80.240.0/20No ROAIRR covering55
192.5.28.0/24No ROAIRR54
192.5.29.0/24No ROAIRR54
192.5.30.0/24No ROAIRR54
192.107.178.0/24No ROAIRR54
192.149.120.0/24No ROAIRR54
2a0b:3b40::/29RPKI validIRR31
192.35.94.0/24RPKI validIRR54
192.67.43.0/24RPKI validIRR54
194.32.69.0/24RPKI validIRR54
194.32.218.0/23RPKI validIRR54
194.34.138.0/24RPKI validIRR54
194.61.92.0/23RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

7 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS7 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
192.35.94.0/24/32RIPENCC
192.67.43.0/24/32RIPENCC
194.32.69.0/24/32RIPENCC
194.32.218.0/23/32RIPENCC
194.34.138.0/24/32RIPENCC
194.61.92.0/23/32RIPENCC
2a0b:3b40::/29/128RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

18 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS7 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
194.61.92.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-30Not announced
194.61.93.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Not announced
194.61.94.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Not announced
2a0b:3b44::/48RIPE—DSTL-MNT2018-07-02Not announced
2a0b:3b44:0:8000::/49RIPE—DSTL-MNT2018-07-02Not announced
146.80.0.0/16RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
192.5.28.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
192.5.29.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
192.5.30.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
192.35.94.0/24RIPEUK DSTLDSTL-MNT2018-10-19Announced
192.67.43.0/24RIPEUK DSTLDSTL-MNT2018-10-19Announced
192.107.178.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
192.149.120.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
194.32.69.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-22Announced
194.32.218.0/23RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
194.34.138.0/24RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-27Announced
194.61.92.0/23RIPEUK DSTLJIPS-NOSC2014-10-24Announced
2a0b:3b40::/29RIPEUK DSTLDSTL-MNT2018-10-19Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS7 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-309561RIPELists AS7 as a direct member
AS-JANETEURORIPELists AS7 as a direct member
AS-JANETPLUSRIPELists AS7 as a direct member
AS-JANETUSRIPELists AS7 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.