asn.dev

Routing security

AS6863 ROSNET-AS OJSC Rosnet

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS6863 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
37.157.16.0/21RPKI validIRR54
46.226.96.0/21RPKI validIRR54
82.149.192.0/19RPKI validIRR54
86.111.0.0/19RPKI validIRR54
94.143.32.0/21RPKI validIRR54
195.90.128.0/18RPKI validIRR54
195.90.160.0/19RPKI validIRR54
195.96.160.0/19RPKI validIRR54
212.5.160.0/19RPKI validIRR54
213.145.40.0/24RPKI validIRR54
217.14.240.0/21RPKI validIRR54
217.171.0.0/20RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS6863 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
37.157.16.0/21/21RIPENCC
46.226.96.0/21/21RIPENCC
82.149.192.0/19/19RIPENCC
86.111.0.0/19/19RIPENCC
94.143.32.0/21/21RIPENCC
195.90.128.0/18/18RIPENCC
195.90.160.0/19/19RIPENCC
195.96.160.0/19/19RIPENCC
212.5.160.0/19/19RIPENCC
213.145.40.0/24/24RIPENCC
217.14.240.0/21/21RIPENCC
217.171.0.0/20/20RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

13 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS6863 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
195.90.128.0/24RIPERU-ROSNET SubBlockRU-ROSNET2001-09-22Not announced
37.157.16.0/21RIPERU-ROSNET BlockROSNET-NOC2012-03-15Announced
46.226.96.0/21RIPERU-ROSNET BlockROSNET-NOC2011-01-21Announced
82.149.192.0/19RIPERU-ROSNET Block (ex. MOTECO)ROSNET-NOC2010-07-15Announced
86.111.0.0/19RIPERU-ROSNET BlockROSNET-NOC2005-08-25Announced
94.143.32.0/21RIPERU-ROSNET BlockROSNET-NOC2008-12-30Announced
195.90.128.0/18RIPERU-ROSNET BlockRU-ROSNET2001-09-22Announced
195.90.160.0/19RIPERU-ROSNET BlockRU-ROSNET2001-09-22Announced
195.96.160.0/19RIPERU-ROSNET BlockRU-ROSNET2001-09-22Announced
212.5.160.0/19RIPERU-ROSNET BlockRU-ROSNET2001-09-22Announced
213.145.40.0/24RIPEJSC Zebra Telecom-RosnetZEBRA-MNT2013-11-05Announced
217.14.240.0/21RIPEJSC Zebra Telecom-RosnetZEBRA-MNT2013-06-10Announced
217.171.0.0/20RIPEJSC AEROCOMROSNET-NOC2008-01-14Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS6863 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BLOCK-SETRIPELists AS6863 as a direct member
AS-BLOCKED-RURIPELists AS6863 as a direct member
AS-CUBIORIPELists AS6863 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANERADBLists AS6863 as a direct member
AS-ROSNETRIPELists AS6863 as a direct member
AS-ROSPRINTRIPELists AS6863 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-22 12:01 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-22. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.