asn.dev

Autonomous system

AS6729 DEMENIN-AS

Unclassified Spamhaus ASN-DROP RIPE

IPv4 addresses 256 1 prefixes
IPv6 prefixes 1 counted as prefixes, not addresses
Countries 1 mostly NL
Exchanges 0 recorded by PCH
Upstreams 2 0 downstream
Flagged prefixes 0 none

Summary

Demenin

Netherlands · AI-generated

legacy

Demenin B.V. is a Dutch company registered in Amsterdam that holds this AS along with a string of other autonomous systems. What the address space is actually used for is not something the public record settles, and this card does not pretend otherwise.

What it's used for

  • The AS announces a single IPv4 /24 plus a large IPv6 block. That is a very small footprint for an operator that holds this many AS numbers.
  • The one IPv4 prefix it announces is not Demenin's own allocation: the block is registered to a different LIR, and its reverse DNS points at a Polish IP-services host. In other words, the routing and the registration belong to different parties.

Notable

  • Demenin holds several autonomous systems and dozens of networks across them, while maintaining no direct peering — connectivity is entirely via transit. Taken together, the pattern is that of an address-space and routing operation rather than a network with its own users.
  • Because the announced space is registered elsewhere and delegated onward, an address here tells you who is routing it, not who is using it. Treat any confident geolocation or use-classification of this AS with suspicion.

Interesting

  • This is a good worked example of why the registered holder of an AS and the real-world operator of its traffic can be two entirely different things. The honest answer for AS6729 is that the second one is unknown.

This description is AI-generated, best-effort context — not authoritative, and provided without any guarantee of accuracy. Source, and how to suggest an edit.

Interconnection

Peering at a glance

Full topology · Graph

Internet exchanges

No exchange port on file. Many exchanges publish no participant list, so this is not proof of absence.

Transit providers

2 upstream, 0 downstream and 2 adjacent networks observed; most-used upstreams first.

ASNetworkPaths seen
AS34907IP SERVICES Sp. zo.o.60
AS43668"AS43668" LLC34

Exchange presence is recorded rather than inferred: the directory collected by Packet Clearing House (https://www.pch.net/ixp/data) on 2026-10-30, licensed CC BY-NC-SA 3.0. Transit is inferred from observed BGP paths, never declared by either party.

Address space

Summary

Shape and geography

IPv4 1 prefixes · 256 addresses IPv6 1 prefixes

CountryNamePrefixes
NLNetherlands2

Registry

Allocation record

RIPE · via Atlas (registry + RDAP)
Registry
RIPE
Handle
AS6729
Registry name
DEMENIN-AS
Registrant
DEMENIN-MNT
Abuse contact
abuse@demenin.net
Registered
2015-10-23
Last changed
2025-03-15
Allocation
allocated

Routing security

RPKI and IRR

Full detail
RPKI
0% valid · 0 valid, 2 with no ROA
ROAs
0 authorising AS6729
ASPA
no ASPA record
IRR
100% registered · 2 of 2 announcements
Route objects
2 naming AS6729

Reputation

Classification and threat

Unclassified Not in the curated lists. Most of the ~80,000 allocated ASNs are not.

Spamhaus DROP

On Spamhaus ASN-DROP Spamhaus lists this entire network (associated domain bignet.ua) as controlled by, or hijacked for, cybercrime. Many operators null-route everything it originates.

No DROP prefixes None of its announced space is on the DROP prefix list.

Spamhaus DROP ("Don't Route Or Peer") lists space and networks run by, or hijacked for, spam and cybercrime operations: 448 networks and 1,849 prefixes, as published 2026-10-30. A short, high-confidence list, so a match is worth taking seriously, and absence from it says little on its own.

FBI IC3

No IC3 indicators Nothing from the FBI IC3 feed.

IC3 threat data is alpha. Absence of an indicator is not evidence of good behaviour, only of absence from this one feed.

Elsewhere

Cross-check