asn.dev

Routing security

AS66666 AS66666

Unclassified

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 23 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 23 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 0 missing · 23 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

23 observed

Every prefix observed with AS66666 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
123.242.148.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.152.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.156.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.160.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.164.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.168.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.172.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.176.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
123.242.180.0/22No ROAIRR other origin24
123.242.184.0/22No ROAIRR other origin11
123.242.188.0/22No ROAIRR other origin11
164.115.224.0/19No ROAIRR other origin11
164.115.224.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.228.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.232.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.236.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.240.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.244.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.245.0/24No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.248.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.250.0/24No ROAIRR other origin26
164.115.251.0/24No ROAIRR other origin1
164.115.252.0/22No ROAIRR other origin26

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS66666 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS66666 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS66666 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-KDDCUSTOMER2RADBLists AS66666 as a direct member
AS-TELSTRA-INTL-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS66666 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-13 13:05 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-13. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.