asn.dev

Routing security

AS64519

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 19 announcements
RPKI invalid 19 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 2 missing · 17 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

19 observed

Every prefix observed with AS64519 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
102.22.242.0/23RPKI invalidNo IRR1
102.22.244.0/23RPKI invalidNo IRR1
2001:448a:513a::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:513b::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:513c::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:513d::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:513e::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:513f::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5130::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5131::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5132::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5133::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5134::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5135::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5136::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5137::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5138::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:5139::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1
2001:448a:c130::/48RPKI invalidIRR other origin1

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS64519 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS64519 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS64519 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-27506-TRANSITRADBLists AS64519 as a direct member
AS132884:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS64519 as a direct member
AS17494:AS-CUSTOMERSAPNICLists AS64519 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-17 12:17 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, collected 2026-10-17. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.