asn.dev

Routing security

AS63385 QC-GOUVERNEMENTDUQUEBEC

Unclassified ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 31 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 31 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 1 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

31 observed

Every prefix observed with AS63385 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
142.80.0.0/17No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.0.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.1.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.2.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.3.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.4.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.5.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.13.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.64.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.65.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.66.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.122.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.123.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.124.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.125.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.126.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.127.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.128.0/17No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.128.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.129.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.130.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.131.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.132.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.133.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.160.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.250.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.251.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.252.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
142.80.253.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.254.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
142.80.255.0/24No ROAIRR covering53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

1 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS63385 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
2607:f540::/32/32ARIN

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

6 objects · 6 not announced

Route objects naming AS63385 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
142.80.0.0/15RADBAdded on behalf of the customerMAINT-AS8122026-03-10Not announced
142.213.0.0/16RADBAdded on behalf of the customerMAINT-AS8122026-03-10Not announced
192.197.161.0/24RADBAdded on behalf of the customerMAINT-AS8122026-03-10Not announced
192.197.162.0/24RADBAdded on behalf of the customerMAINT-AS8122026-03-10Not announced
192.197.164.0/24RADBAdded on behalf of the customerMAINT-AS8122026-03-10Not announced
2607:f540::/32ARINGouvernement du Quebec (Government of Quebec)MNT-GQGQ2026-09-23Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS63385 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ROGERS:AS-CUSTOMERSRADBLists AS63385 as a direct member
AS198949:AS-SDRADBLists AS63385 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-12 12:10 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-12. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.