asn.dev

Routing security

AS61307 EE-AS-STV

Residential RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 13 of 13 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 13 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

13 observed

Every prefix observed with AS61307 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a03:4360::/32RPKI validIRR30
31.24.56.0/21RPKI validIRR51
31.24.56.0/22RPKI validIRR covering52
31.24.60.0/22RPKI validIRR covering52
85.196.192.0/18RPKI validIRR51
85.196.192.0/19RPKI validIRR covering52
85.196.224.0/19RPKI validIRR covering52
93.185.240.0/20RPKI validIRR51
93.185.240.0/21RPKI validIRR covering52
93.185.248.0/21RPKI validIRR covering52
185.97.248.0/22RPKI validIRR51
185.97.248.0/23RPKI validIRR covering20
185.97.250.0/23RPKI validIRR covering20

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

13 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS61307 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
31.24.56.0/21/21RIPENCC
31.24.56.0/22/22RIPENCC
31.24.60.0/22/22RIPENCC
85.196.192.0/18/18RIPENCC
85.196.192.0/19/19RIPENCC
85.196.224.0/19/19RIPENCC
93.185.240.0/20/20RIPENCC
93.185.240.0/21/21RIPENCC
93.185.248.0/21/21RIPENCC
185.97.248.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.97.248.0/23/23RIPENCC
185.97.250.0/23/23RIPENCC
2a03:4360::/32/32RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

5 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS61307 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
31.24.56.0/21RIPEAS STVMNT-EE-STV2012-11-29Announced
85.196.192.0/18RIPEAS STVMNT-EE-STV2012-11-30Announced
93.185.240.0/20RIPEAS STVMNT-EE-STV2012-11-30Announced
185.97.248.0/22RIPEAS STVMNT-EE-STV2016-03-18Announced
2a03:4360::/32RIPESTV NETMNT-EE-STV2016-03-21Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS61307 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BALT-IXRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS-INFONETDCRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS-PITER-IX-CPRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-SPECRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS-TRANSROUTE-TRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS1299:AS-TWELVE99-EU-V4RIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS1299:AS-TWELVE99-EU-V6RIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS207800:AS-RTIX-SETRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS39607:AS-PITER-IX-HELRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS48193:AS-PITER-IX-FRARIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS49634:AS-PITER-IX-RIGARIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS49869:AS-PITER-IX-MSKRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member
AS57936:AS-PITER-IX-TLLRIPELists AS61307 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-11 12:23 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-11. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.