asn.dev

Routing security

AS6127 IDSC

Unclassified AFRINIC

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 33 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 33 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

33 observed

Every prefix observed with AS6127 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
163.121.6.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.8.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.9.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.10.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.121.15.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.18.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.21.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.24.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.26.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.29.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.32.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.35.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.36.0/24No ROAIRR covering50
163.121.40.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.49.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.57.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.58.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.121.59.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
163.121.60.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.61.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
163.121.62.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.63.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
163.121.64.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.70.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.72.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.73.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.74.0/24No ROAIRR covering53
163.121.75.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.76.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.79.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.82.0/24No ROAIRR covering51
163.121.84.0/24No ROAIRR covering52
163.121.126.0/24No ROAIRR covering52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS6127 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

4 objects · 4 not announced

Route objects naming AS6127 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
163.121.0.0/19AFRINICIDSCAFRINIC-HM-MNT2022-07-08Not announced
163.121.32.0/19AFRINICIDSCAFRINIC-HM-MNT2022-07-08Not announced
163.121.64.0/19AFRINICIDSCAFRINIC-HM-MNT2022-07-08Not announced
163.121.96.0/19AFRINICIDSCAFRINIC-HM-MNT2022-07-08Not announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS6127 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-ETISALAT_MISRAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-INTERPACKETRIPELists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-LINKDOTNETAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-LINKDOTNETRIPELists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-ORANGE-EGAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-RAYAAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-RAYARIPELists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-TEDATAAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-TEDATARIPELists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-TEDATA-BACKUPAFRINICLists AS6127 as a direct member
AS-TEDATA-BACKUPRIPELists AS6127 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-16 12:09 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-16. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.