asn.dev

Routing security

AS61207 ILAIT

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 65% 11 of 17 announcements
RPKI invalid 5 dropped by validating networks
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 65% 6 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

17 observed

Every prefix observed with AS61207 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
62.109.34.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
94.246.96.0/23RPKI invalidNo IRR1
213.212.2.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
213.212.42.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
213.212.50.0/24RPKI invalidNo IRR1
185.248.80.0/22No ROAIRR52
212.16.184.0/22RPKI validNo IRR52
2a02:fc00::/29RPKI validIRR30
87.237.208.0/21RPKI validIRR52
89.221.240.0/23RPKI validIRR52
89.221.243.0/24RPKI validIRR52
89.221.247.0/24RPKI validIRR52
89.221.248.0/21RPKI validIRR52
91.240.67.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.15.120.0/22RPKI validIRR52
185.215.196.0/22RPKI validIRR52
195.35.82.0/23RPKI validIRR52

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS61207 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
87.237.208.0/21/21RIPENCC
89.221.240.0/23/23RIPENCC
89.221.243.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.221.247.0/24/24RIPENCC
89.221.248.0/21/21RIPENCC
91.240.67.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.15.120.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.215.196.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.215.196.0/24/24RIPENCC
195.35.82.0/23/23RIPENCC
212.16.184.0/22/22RIPENCC
2a02:fc00::/29/29RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

16 objects · 5 not announced

Route objects naming AS61207 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.248.80.0/23RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2020-12-28Not announced
185.248.80.0/24RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2020-12-28Not announced
185.248.81.0/24RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2020-12-28Not announced
192.121.56.0/24RIPEItm8 Sverige ABRESILANS-MNT2025-07-02Not announced
194.145.164.0/24RIPEInfoguardILAIT-MNT2020-12-28Not announced
87.237.208.0/21RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2022-02-02Announced
89.221.240.0/23RIPE—MNT-RABMAN2022-01-07Announced
89.221.243.0/24RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2019-10-30Announced
89.221.247.0/24RIPE—MNT-RABMAN2022-01-18Announced
89.221.248.0/21RIPE—MNT-RABMAN2022-01-07Announced
91.240.67.0/24RIPE—MNT-PVDATANET2026-02-27Announced
185.15.120.0/22RIPEILAITILAIT-MNT2019-09-02Announced
185.215.196.0/22RIPE—ILAIT-MNT2019-09-06Announced
185.248.80.0/22RIPE—SE-TSI-1-MNT2019-04-01Announced
195.35.82.0/23RIPE—MNT-RABMAN2022-02-01Announced
2a02:fc00::/29RIPEILAITILAIT-MNT2020-03-31Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS61207 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-BAFFINRIPELists AS61207 as a direct member
AS12552:AS-GCNETRIPELists AS61207 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-27 12:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-27. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.