asn.dev

Routing security

AS61087 DGTL-UK

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 100% 7 of 7 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 8 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

7 observed

Every prefix observed with AS61087 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a0e:4000::/44RPKI validIRR29
2a0e:4001:20::/44RPKI validIRR33
2a0e:4007:fff4::/48RPKI validIRR34
45.14.244.0/24RPKI validIRR53
45.150.65.0/24RPKI validIRR53
91.194.11.0/24RPKI validIRR52
94.141.120.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

8 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS61087 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
45.14.244.0/24/24RIPENCC
45.150.65.0/24/24RIPENCC
91.194.11.0/24/24RIPENCC
94.141.120.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a0e:4000::/32/48RIPENCC
2a0e:4000::/44/44RIPENCC
2a0e:4001:20::/44/44RIPENCC
2a0e:4007:fff4::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS61087 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
2a0e:4000::/32RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-08-24Not announced
45.14.244.0/24RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-07-20Announced
45.150.65.0/24RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-07-20Announced
91.194.11.0/24RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-07-28Announced
94.141.120.0/24RIPE—MNT-DGTL2024-12-11Announced
2a0e:4000::/44RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-08-24Announced
2a0e:4001:20::/44RIPE—MNT-DGTL2026-07-29Announced
2a0e:4007:fff4::/48RIPE—MNT-DGTL2025-02-23Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS61087 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CWLRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-ITS6RIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-OVHRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS-TAKEWYNRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS209735:AS-LAGRANGE-LONRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS209735:AS-LAGRANGE-MANRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member
AS61087:AS-DGTLRIPELists AS61087 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-23 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-23. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.