asn.dev

Routing security

AS6099 BAE-NET-ASN

Education ARIN

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 20 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 20 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

20 observed

Every prefix observed with AS6099 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
204.88.192.0/19No ROAIRR53
204.88.192.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
204.88.208.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
206.110.0.0/16No ROAIRR53
206.110.0.0/17No ROAIRR covering57
206.110.128.0/17No ROAIRR covering57
206.110.198.0/23No ROAIRR covering54
206.210.224.0/19No ROAIRR53
206.210.224.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
206.210.240.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
207.163.0.0/16No ROAIRR53
207.163.0.0/17No ROAIRR covering57
207.163.3.0/24No ROAIRR covering57
207.163.80.0/21No ROAIRR covering55
207.163.128.0/17No ROAIRR covering57
207.163.200.0/21No ROAIRR covering54
209.132.128.0/19No ROAIRR53
209.132.128.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
209.132.144.0/20No ROAIRR covering57
2605:9e80::/32No ROAIRR33

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS6099 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

8 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS6099 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
198.200.160.0/24RADBBerkeley USDMAINT-AS60992023-11-13Not announced
206.209.192.0/20RADBBerkeley USDMAINT-AS60992023-11-13Not announced
204.88.192.0/19RADBHayward USDMAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced
206.110.0.0/16RADBAlameda County Office of Education BLK1MAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced
206.210.224.0/19RADBNew Haven USDMAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced
207.163.0.0/16RADBAlameda County Office of Education BLK2MAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced
209.132.128.0/19RADBAlameda County Office of Education BLK3MAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced
2605:9e80::/32RADBAlameda County Office of Education IPv6MAINT-AS60992023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS6099 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CALREN2RADBLists AS6099 as a direct member
AS-COMCAST-EDIARADBLists AS6099 as a direct member
AS-HURRICANEV6RADBLists AS6099 as a direct member
AS198949:AS-SDRADBLists AS6099 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-01 13:04 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-01. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.