asn.dev

Routing security

AS60847 AUTO-1

Unclassified RIPE Content

RPKI valid 100% 15 of 15 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 14 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

15 observed

Every prefix observed with AS60847 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
38.172.48.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
38.172.49.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
38.172.50.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
38.172.51.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
91.244.227.0/24RPKI validIRR52
93.93.105.0/24RPKI validIRR55
93.93.106.0/23RPKI validIRR54
185.92.12.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.92.13.0/24RPKI validIRR covering54
185.92.14.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.92.15.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.218.216.0/24RPKI validIRR54
185.218.217.0/24RPKI validIRR52
185.218.218.0/24RPKI validIRR55
185.218.219.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

14 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS60847 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
38.172.48.0/22/24ARIN
91.244.227.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.93.105.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.93.106.0/23/23RIPENCC
93.93.106.0/24/24RIPENCC
93.93.107.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.92.12.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.92.13.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.92.14.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.92.15.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.218.216.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.218.217.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.218.218.0/24/24RIPENCC
185.218.219.0/24/24RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 2 not announced

Route objects naming AS60847 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
38.172.48.0/22ARINRoute Registered for Cogent Communications Customer - Karel Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S.MNT-COGC2025-10-08Not announced
185.92.12.0/22RIPEROITELMNT-ROITEL2015-03-31Not announced
91.244.227.0/24RIPEROITELMNT-ROITEL2015-03-19Announced
93.93.105.0/24RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2025-11-28Announced
93.93.106.0/23RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2025-07-30Announced
185.92.12.0/24RIPE—MNT-ROITEL2019-08-07Announced
185.92.14.0/24RIPE—MNT-ROITEL2020-12-22Announced
185.92.15.0/24RIPE—MNT-ROITEL2019-08-07Announced
185.218.216.0/24RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2024-01-18Announced
185.218.217.0/24RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2024-12-16Announced
185.218.218.0/24RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2026-02-09Announced
185.218.219.0/24RIPE—MNT-NETCEN2026-02-09Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS60847 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-3C1BRIPELists AS60847 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS60847 as a direct member
AS-TTNETRIPELists AS60847 as a direct member
AS-TURKNETTRRIPELists AS60847 as a direct member
AS-UDOSRADBLists AS60847 as a direct member
AS199911:AS-REGPEXRIPELists AS60847 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-30 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-30. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.