asn.dev

Routing security

AS60053 SE-HABO-AS

Unclassified RIPE

RPKI valid 0% 0 of 2 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 2 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 0 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

2 observed

Every prefix observed with AS60053 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
193.183.115.0/24No ROAIRR52
2001:67c:2ad0::/48No ROAIRR31

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

0 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS60053 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

No ROA names this AS as an authorised origin.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

2 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS60053 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
193.183.115.0/24RIPEHabo KommunRESILANS-MNT2014-06-11Announced
2001:67c:2ad0::/48RIPEHabo KommunTDC-SE-MNT2015-11-16Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS60053 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-WETTERNETRIPELists AS60053 as a direct member
AS3246:AS-CUSTOMERSRIPELists AS60053 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-27 12:06 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-27. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.