asn.dev

Routing security

AS59455 CSG-AS

Unclassified RIPE NSP

RPKI valid 91% 10 of 11 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 1 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 91% 0 missing · 1 other origin
ROAs 10 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

11 observed

Every prefix observed with AS59455 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
2a06:9801:21a::/48No ROAIRR28
194.26.198.0/24RPKI validIRR other origin55
2a04:2340::/29RPKI validIRR32
2a13:9500:18a::/48RPKI validIRR32
46.17.208.0/21RPKI validIRR54
185.23.52.0/22RPKI validIRR54
185.33.192.0/22RPKI validIRR54
185.79.108.0/23RPKI validIRR54
193.33.116.0/23RPKI validIRR54
193.111.33.0/24RPKI validIRR54
222.167.193.0/24RPKI validIRR54

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

10 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS59455 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
46.17.208.0/21/22RIPENCC
185.23.52.0/22/24RIPENCC
185.33.192.0/22/22RIPENCC
185.79.108.0/23/23RIPENCC
193.33.116.0/23/23RIPENCC
193.111.33.0/24/24RIPENCC
194.26.198.0/24/24RIPENCC
222.167.193.0/24/24RIPENCC
2a04:2340::/29/29RIPENCC
2a13:9500:18a::/48/48RIPENCC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 1 not announced

Route objects naming AS59455 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
185.98.108.0/22RIPE185.98.108.0/22 MHV SubnetCSG-MNT2015-04-29Not announced
46.17.208.0/21RIPE46.17.208.0/21 Cleartream Group SubnetCSG-MNT2014-11-06Announced
185.23.52.0/22RIPE185.23.52.0/22 Cleartream SubnetCSG-MNT2014-10-30Announced
185.33.192.0/22RIPE185.33.192.0/22 SubnetCSG-MNT2019-02-18Announced
185.79.108.0/23RIPE185.79.108.0/23CSG-MNT2015-06-03Announced
193.33.116.0/23RIPEDVS Computers LtdDVSHOST-MNT2015-09-24Announced
193.111.33.0/24RIPEDVS Computers LtdDVSHOST-MNT2015-09-24Announced
222.167.193.0/24RADBautogenMAINT-AS8342026-02-27Announced
222.167.193.0/24RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-02-27Announced
2a04:2340::/29RIPEClearstream v6 /29CSG-MNT2014-06-02Announced
2a06:9801:21a::/48RIPE—MIKRISPHERE-LTD-MNT2026-10-29Announced
2a13:9500:18a::/48RIPE—NETUTILS-MNT2026-06-01Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS59455 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CSGPeeringDBDeclared by the operator as its own set
AS-CSGRIPELists AS59455 as a direct member
AS-HNSRIPELists AS59455 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V4RIPELists AS59455 as a direct member
AS-RETN-ACTUAL-V6RIPELists AS59455 as a direct member
AS8801:AS-CUSTOMERS-UKRIPELists AS59455 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-30 12:03 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-30. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.