asn.dev

Routing security

AS59016 HACN - China Broadcast Henan Network Co., Ltd

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 88% 22 of 25 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 3 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 0% 23 missing · 2 other origin
ROAs 22 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

25 observed

Every prefix observed with AS59016 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
59.152.36.0/24No ROANo IRR4
59.152.38.0/24No ROAIRR other origin6
59.152.39.0/24No ROAIRR other origin6
103.237.176.0/20RPKI validNo IRR4
103.237.192.0/19RPKI validNo IRR4
103.237.224.0/20RPKI validNo IRR4
103.237.224.0/24RPKI validNo IRR4
103.237.240.0/21RPKI validNo IRR4
2401:3a80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3b80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3c80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3d80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3e80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3f80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4a80::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3880::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:3980::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4180::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4280::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4380::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4480::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4580::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4680::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4780::/32RPKI validNo IRR1
2401:4880::/32RPKI validNo IRR1

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

22 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS59016 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

0 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS59016 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

No route objects name this AS as origin.

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS59016 directly show who expects to carry it.

No as-set lists this AS directly.

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-11-07 13:08 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-11-07. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.