asn.dev

Routing security

AS58851 YOUWE Priority of FashionBeijingInformation Technology Co.,Ltd

Unclassified APNIC

RPKI valid 100% 12 of 12 announcements
RPKI invalid 0 none
No ROA 0 not covered by any ROA
IRR registered 100% 0 missing · 0 other origin
ROAs 12 authorising this AS

Announcements

What this network originates

12 observed

Every prefix observed with AS58851 as its origin, checked against RPKI and the IRR. Problems sort first.

PrefixRPKIIRRVantage points
1.119.0.0/17RPKI validIRR53
1.119.124.0/22RPKI validIRR53
1.119.128.0/18RPKI validIRR53
1.119.178.0/23RPKI validIRR5
1.119.192.0/20RPKI validIRR53
43.248.232.0/22RPKI validIRR53
103.16.124.0/22RPKI validIRR53
103.244.64.0/22RPKI validIRR53
103.254.112.0/22RPKI validIRR53
114.112.136.0/21RPKI validIRR53
114.112.144.0/21RPKI validIRR53
211.102.208.0/20RPKI validIRR53

RPKI · ROAs

Route origin authorisations

12 ROAs

Signed statements by address holders that AS58851 may originate these prefixes, up to the maximum length shown.

PrefixMax lengthTrust anchor
1.119.0.0/17/17APNIC
1.119.124.0/22/22APNIC
1.119.128.0/18/18APNIC
1.119.178.0/23/23APNIC
1.119.192.0/20/20APNIC
43.248.232.0/22/22APNIC
103.16.124.0/22/22APNIC
103.244.64.0/22/22APNIC
103.254.112.0/22/22APNIC
114.112.136.0/21/21APNIC
114.112.144.0/21/21APNIC
211.102.208.0/20/20APNIC

ROA-based and RPKI-valid-only prefix lists for routers are on asn.ipinfo.app.

RPKI · ASPA

Declared transit providers

No ASPA record This network has not published an ASPA object. ASPA lets a network sign the list of its transit providers, so routers can reject paths that route through anyone else (route leaks). Only a few thousand networks publish one so far, so its absence is normal.

IRR

Registered route objects

12 objects · 0 not announced

Route objects naming AS58851 as origin, across RADb, the RIR registries, ALTDB and NTTCOM. Objects that are registered but not announced come first: a stale object lets anyone who can spoof this origin through an IRR-built filter.

PrefixSourceDescriptionMaintainerChangedRouting
1.119.0.0/17RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
1.119.124.0/22RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
1.119.128.0/18RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
1.119.178.0/23RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532025-05-22Announced
1.119.192.0/20RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
43.248.232.0/22RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-20Announced
103.16.124.0/22RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
103.244.64.0/22RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
103.254.112.0/22RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
114.112.136.0/21RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
114.112.144.0/21RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced
211.102.208.0/20RADBCMI (Customer Route)MAINT-AS584532023-11-13Announced

IRR

AS-sets

The as-set is what upstreams expand to build this network's customer filter. Sets that list AS58851 directly show who expects to carry it.

AS-setWhereRelationship
AS-CTBC-CUSTOMERS248RADBLists AS58851 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-CMNETAPNICLists AS58851 as a direct member
AS58453:AS-CMNETRADBLists AS58851 as a direct member
AS58807:AS-CMIN2APNICLists AS58851 as a direct member
AS58807:AS-CMIN2RADBLists AS58851 as a direct member

RPKI from rpki-client, validated 2026-10-20 11:55 UTC. IRR from ARIN, RADB, RIPE, ALTDB, APNIC, LACNIC, NTTCOM, AFRINIC, collected 2026-10-20. Cross-check on bgp.he.net.